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ESSAY
ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. v. PENA AND THE
CONTINUING IRRELEVANCE OF SUPREME COURT
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DECISIONS
NEAL DEVINS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Ten years ago, the Reagan Administration's campaign against
affirmative action was on the verge of collapse. The
Administration's efforts to convince the Supreme Court to reject
preferences and allow only make-whole relief to the actual victims of discrimination were turned away in 1986.' Smarting
from that defeat, the White House abandoned a Department of
Justice proposal to rescind an executive order requiring federal
contractors to set numerical hiring goals.' By the spring of
1987, after the Supreme Court ruled that a female could be

* Thanks to Jason Kelley and Krista Weber for research assistance. Thanks also

to Mechelle Dickerson, Dave Douglas, Alan Meese, John McGinnis, Jeremy Rabkin,
David Strauss, and Mark Tushnet for their comments on a draft of this Essay. This
Essay is dedicated to the William and Mary Law Review. Over the past three years,
I have had the good fortune to serve as the Review's faculty advisor. Thanks to the
good nature and hard work of the Review's staff and editors, I have cherished this
assignment.
1. See Local No. 93, Intl Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501
(1986) (holding that a Title VII consent decree may benefit individuals who were not
the actual victims of the defendant's discriminatory practices); Local 28, Sheet Metal
Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (holding that Title VII allows a court to
order affirmative race-conscious relief as a remedy for past discrimination); Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion) (holding that racial
classifications must be justified by a compelling State purpose, which is not met by
societal discrimination alone, and that the means chosen to effectuate that purpose
must be narrowly tailored).
2. See Gerald M. Boyd, Goals for Hiring To Stay in Place, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25,
1986, at Al.
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hired over a marginally better-qualified male to alleviate sex
imbalance,3 journalists and academics concluded that the "affirmative action wars [were] over,"4 with the Administration having suffered another "near-deathblow" defeat.5
These obituaries proved to be premature. Like a phoenix rising from the ashes, calls for a "color-blind society" are again
sweeping the nation.' Starting with a 1993 grass roots effort to
amend the California Constitution to prohibit the state from
granting race and gender preferences and with no end in sight
(at least not until the 1996 elections), affirmative action is once
again an incendiary topic. On March 15, 1995, Senate Majority
leader and presidential candidate Robert Dole (R-Kan.) called for
a comprehensive review of federal affirmative action programs,
proclaiming that "fighting discrimination should never become
an excuse for abandoning the color-blind ideal."7 Two months
later, Charles Canady (R-Fla.), Chair of the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on the Constitution, concluded that, "[ilf there
ever was a time for affirmative action, we are moving beyond
it."' For his part, after launching a government-wide review of
affirmative action by saying "[w]e shouldn't be defending things
we can't defend,"9 President Bill Clinton, on July 19, 1995, reaffirmed the principle of affirmative action by declaring that "[t]he
job of ending discrimination is not done."" The very next day,
however, the University of California Regents heeded Republican Governor and then-1996 presidential candidate Pete
Wilson's claim that racial preferences "threaten to infect the

3. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 641-42 (1987) (holding
that Title VII allows gender to be considered a factor in promotion decisions).
4. Herman Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 Affirmative Action Cases: It's All Over
but the Shouting, 86 MICH. L. REV. 524, 524 (1987).
5. Marcia Coyle, Administration Loses Major Round on Reverse Bias, NATL L.J.,
Apr. 6, 1987, at 5.
6. For a provocative explanation of why a call to end affirmative action is not
really a call for color blindness, see David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness,
1986 SuP. CT. REV. 99.
7. 141 CONG. REC. S3929 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
8. Dan Freedman, Government Re-examining Affirmative Action, TIMES-UNION
(Albany), May 14, 1995, at A20.
9. John F. Harris, Clinton Avows Support for Affirmative Action, WASH. POST,
July 20, 1995, at Al.

10. Id.
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nation with 'the deadly virus of tribalism""' by voting to eliminate affirmative action hiring and admissions. 2
On June 12, 1995, the Supreme Court added its voice to this
clamor. In Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena," the Court, by a
five-to-four vote, refused for the first time to uphold a congressionally approved affirmative action plan. 4 The program at
issue, the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 (STURAA),' set aside "not less than 10 percent" of appropriated funds for socially and economically disadvantaged firms and made use of race-based presumptions to
help determine disadvantaged status. 6 Ruling that the
STURAA set-aside and other federal affirmative action programs were subject to the same standard of strict scrutiny
review as state and local government programs, Adarand both
tightened the standards governing affirmative action and overturned Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,'7 a 1990 Supreme
Court decision that made use of "'a lenient standard, resembling intermediate scrutiny, in assessing' the constitutionality
of federal race-based action." 8 Adarand, however, did not invalidate the STURAA set-aside. Rather than apply strict scrutiny review to Adarand Constructors' challenge to the STURAA
program,' 9 the Court sent the dispute back to the district

11. Bill Stall, Wilson Steps Up Affirmative Action Attack, LA. TIMES, July 19,
1995, at A3.

12. See Amy Wallace & Dave Lesher, UC Regents, in Historic Vote, Wipe Out Affirmative Action, LA. TIMES, July 21, 1995, at Al.
13. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
14. Id. at 2118.
15. Pub. L. No. 100-17, 101 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections of 23 U.S.C.).
16. Id. § 106, 101 Stat. at 145-46 (codified in scattered sections of 23 U.S.C.).
Under the statute, nonminorities can establish eligibility by demonstrating that they
are socially and economically disadvantaged. See id. The presumptive eligibility of
minority group members, however, can be rebutted "if a third party comes forward
with evidence suggesting that the participant is not, in fact, ... disadvantaged."
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2103.
17. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
18. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2104 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16
F.3d 1537, 1544 (10th Cir. 1994)).
19. Adarand Constructors, a "nondisadvantaged" highway construction company,
challenged the STURAA set-aside after its low bid for a guardrail subcontracting
project was turned away in favor of a somewhat higher bid by a "disadvantaged"
minority subcontractor. Id. at 2102-04. In particular, Adarand Constructors chal-
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court where it had originated.'
Adarand promised to be a landmark, presenting the Court
with an opportunity to resolve a longstanding controversy about
whether all race preferences are inherently suspect. Along these
lines, Adarand Constructors and the Clinton Justice Department, which defended the STURAA set-aside, advanced strikingly different approaches to judicial review of federal affirmative
action programs. Adarand Constructors, represented by the
conservative Mountain States Legal Foundation, argued that
both federal and state affirmative action programs should be
subject to "the most rigid scrutiny" and "must be designed to
remedy clearly identifiable disdrimination."'l Echoing the Reagan Justice Department's calls for victim-specific relief, Mountain States called upon the Court to strike down most federal
affirmative action programs.2 For its part, the Clinton Justice
Department embraced Metro Broadcasting,Inc. v. FCC,' referring to "Congress's broad powers in matters of race" and its status as "a co-equal branch." 4 Furthermore, noting that, "in the
event that Congress should err in its choice of [an affirmative
action program], its broadly representative character provides a
check,"' the Clinton Administration argued that Congress's
decisions should be accorded "great weight."26
Adarand rejected both the Clinton Administration's laissezfaire approach to federal affirmative action programs and Mountain States' call for "the most rigid scrutiny." 7 The Court set-

lenged a cash incentive program that the Department of Transportation used in

implementing the STURAA set-aside. Under this provision, prime contractors could
receive up to two percent of the original contract amount by awarding subcontracts
to two or more disadvantaged businesses.
20. Id. at 2118.
21. Brief for the Petitioner at 18, 40, Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (No. 93-1841).
22. See id. at 18.
23. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
24. Brief for the Respondents at 35, Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (No. 93-1841).
25. Id. at 36.
26. Id. at 35 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980)).
27. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117. In Metro Broadcasting, the Court concluded
that federal affirmative action programs are "constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve important governmental objectives within the power of Congress
and are substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 565 (1990).
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tled, instead, on a middle-ground position. Specifically, by insisting that federal, as well as state, affirmative action programs be
"narrowly tailored" to serve a "compelling governmental interest," Adarand substituted strict scrutiny review for Metro
Broadcasting's approval of a less demanding intermediate review standard.' At the same time, Adarand sought to "dispel
the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in
fact."'29 Referring to the "unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination," Adarand
emphasized that "government is not disqualified from acting in
response to it." 30
Adarand's mixed message makes it a rather slippery precedent. Moreover, because the Court remanded the case rather
than resolving the dispute, Adarand offers little guidance about
the application of strict scrutiny review. Nevertheless, most
journalists and legislators viewed the decision as monumental.
The Los Angeles Times and the Washington Post described
Adarand as "a potentially fatal blow,"3' "jeopardiz[ing] a broad
range of federal affirmative action programs." 2 Likewise, the
Wall Street Journalsaw the Supreme Court as "join[ing] the assault on affirmative action, attacking the foundations of the vast
federal network" of preferential treatment programs.3" In Congress, Adarand was alternatively vilified as the "re-subordination of African Americans" or "laying the legal foundation to
pave the way back toward slavery"34 and heralded as "historic,"35 "str[iking] an important blow in defense of the fundamen-

28. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
29. Id. (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519).
30. Id.
31. David G. Savage, High Court Deals Severe Blow to Federal Affirmative Action,
L.A. TIMES, June 13, 1995, at Al.
32. Joan Biskupic, Court Toughens Standard for Federal Affirmative Action, WASH.
PoST, June 13, 1995, at Al.
33. Paul M. Barrett, Not Affirmed: Supreme Court Ruling Imperils U.S. Programs
of Racial Preference, WALL ST. J., June 13, 1995, at Al.
34. Kevin Merida & Kenneth J. Cooper, Alarmed by High Court Rulings, Black
Leaders Prepare for Action, WASH. POST, July 3, 1995, at Al (quoting black political
leaders and civil rights activists).

35. 141 CONG.
McConnell).

REC. S8530

(daily ed. June 16,

1995) (statement of Sen.
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tal moral and constitutional principles of nondiscrimination."36

Some of Adarand's early reviews, however, dismissed the
decision as inconsequential. For the New York Times's Linda
Greenhouse and columnist Charles Krauthammer, Adarand was
"very nearly beside the point"37 and "insignifican[t]"" because
it is in the "[world of politics,] not the courtroom, where the fate
of affirmative action will ultimately be decided." 9 George Will
also questioned the decision's reach, condemning the Court for
"settl[ing] nothing" because it was so "tangled in the toils of its
hairsplitting reasoning... [and] so mesmerized by its classifications that do not helpfully classify."40 For example, much to
Will's chagrin, President Clinton and his Assistant Attorney
General for Civil Rights, Deval Patrick, could speak of the
Court's ruling as "a setback, but not a disaster"" and criticize
"[elxaggerated claims about the end of affirmative action-whether in celebration or dismay." 2
No doubt, the reach and limits of Adarand are hard to predict.
Rather than stake out a hard-line position, the Court-following
the "judicial practice of dealing with the largest questions in the
most narrow way" 43 -has positioned itself to ratchet up, ratchet
down, or maintain its ambiguous application of strict scrutiny
review to federal affirmative action programs. As such, the
meaning of Adarand, at least for the time being, will be settled
in the political arena. In particular, elected officials will interpret Adarand to fit their policy objectives, and, in all likelihood,
Adarand's meaning will be defined more by these political forces
than by lower court judges' sorting out an ambiguous Supreme
36. 141 CONG. REC. H5761 (daily ed. June 13, 1995) (statement of Rep. Canady).
37. Linda Greenhouse, In Step on Racial Policy, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1995, at
Al.
38. Charles Krauthammer, Affirmative Action: Settle It Out of Court . . , WASH.
POST, June 16, 1995, at A25.
39. Greenhouse, supra note 37, at Al.
40. George Will, Latest Court Ruling Settles Nothing, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), June 14, 1995, at B7.
41. Patrick Downplays Impact of Adarand, Wash. Insider (BNA) (June 16, 1995),
available in LEXIS, BNA library, Bnawt file.
42. Susan R. Kneller, Clinton, Civil Rights Supporters, Find Hope in Adarand
Decision, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 114, at D-2 (June 14, 1995).
43. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,

J., concurring).
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Court decision.
This phenomenon of narrow judicial holdings whose meanings
are defined by social and political forces is hardly unique."
Without question, it permeates the Supreme Court's affirmative
action jurisprudence. Specifically, these decisions are so indeterminate that they essentially are nonbinding. As a result, while
political actors may claim allegiance to them, these decisions can
be recalibrated at will-trumpeted or ignored to match the desired outcome. For example, Reagan-era affirmative action decisions strikingly similar to Adarand were spun to facilitate
broad-based elected government support of race and gender
preferences.4 5
This Essay will highlight the Court's de minimis role in settling the affirmative action wars. Part II will examine the Reagan and Bush Justice Departments' failed campaign against race
and gender preferences. This discussion will call attention to
three interrelated phenomena, each of which has played a decisive role in shaping the terms of affirmative action
decisionmaking. First, by refusing to articulate (let alone stick
to) a comprehensible position on preferences, the Court has
played next to no role in affecting either public discourse or
elected government behavior in this area. Second, with the
Court saying so little, elected officials have freely interpreted
Court decisions to suit their political needs. Third, social and
political forces, which strongly support preferences, have dominated elected government affirmative action decisionmaking.
While many forces point in the other direction, during the Reagan and Bush years, the forces favoring affirmative action dominated. Outside of the Department of Justice, as Part II will
show, there was strong support for affirmative action in both

44. See generally NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES: THE SUPREME
COURT, ELECTED GOVERNMENT AND THE ABORTION DISPUTE (forthcoming 1996); Louis
FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES 44 (1988) ("Although the holding of the Supreme
Court is of utmost importance, it often serves as but one stage of an ongoing constitutional process shared with lower courts, the executive branch, and legislators.");
Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 581 (1993)
(stating that courts "facilitate and mold the national dialogue concerning the meaning of the Constitution").
45. See infra part II.A.
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Congress and nearly all executive departments and agencies. In
particular, these forces undermined Reagan and Bush Justice
Department efforts to convince the White House, executive agencies, and state and local governments to join the Justice Department in opposing affirmative action. Indeed, Reagan and Bush
Administration officials often undercut Justice Department efforts through narrow readings of Supreme Court restrictions on
affirmative actions and expansive readings of Court decisions
upholding race and gender preferences.
By considering Adarand and its immediate aftermath, Part III
will extend Part II's examination of the forces that shape affirmative action decisionmaking. Specifically, Part III will demonstrate the continuing vitality of the three phenomena identified
in Part II. For example, a close look at Adarand's middle-ground
approach to federal affirmative action programs will demonstrate clearly that the C~urt went out of its way to say very
little about affirmative action, preferring instead to leave this
divisive issue to elected government. Along these lines, Part III
will compare Adarand to Supreme Court efforts to find a middleground solution to the abortion issue in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey. 6 Part III, moreover, will consider the ways in which
elected government defines a Court decision through political
action. This discussion will focus on how affirmative action supporters and opponents have twisted Adarand to suit their political objectives. The Clinton Administration, for example, has
proven adept at defending affirmative action as being consistent
with both the spirit and letter of Adarand. This discussion will
reveal the continuing vitality of those social and political forces
that strongly favor affirmative action programs.
Finally, Part IV will extend Parts I and II's assessments of
the constitutional dialogue that takes place among the Supreme
Court, elected officials, and social and political forces. This discussion will focus on identifying the appropriate judicial role in
establishing constitutional norms. Specifically, by placing hardly
any constitutional limits on government-sponsored race and
gender preferences, the Court has done more than limit its role
in affirmative action decisionmaking; it has undermined its

46. 114 S. Ct. 909 (1994).

1996]

SUPREME COURT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DECISIONS

681

institutional legitimacy by allowing elected officials to treat
Court decisions as little more than "waste paper."'
II. THE PAST IS PROLOGUE: WHY THE REAGAN-BUSH CAMPAIGN
AGAINST AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FAILED

Beginning with the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan and ending with George Bush's 1992 electoral defeat, the Department of
Justice fought and lost a holy war over affirmative action.
Throughout this struggle, the Department's principal foe was
not the Supreme Court. In fact, though its judicial defeats may
have outnumbered its victories, the Department unquestionably
made some inroads. 8 The Department, however, was no match
for affrmative action supporters inside and outside of government-Congress, the states, business, civil rights interest
groups, and other parts of the executive branch.
A. The Reagan Administration
The opening salvo in the Reagan-Bush campaign against affirmative action was fired in the 1980 election. Challenging Carter
Administration affirmative action initiatives, Reagan campaigned on a platform that argued that "equal opportunity
should not be jeopardized by bureaucratic regulations and decisions which rely on quotas, ratios, and numerical requirements
to exclude some individuals in favor of others." 9 Echoing this
sentiment, Reagan's first and only Civil Rights Division head,
William Bradford Reynolds, decried racial preferences as "bust
as] offensive to standards of human decency today as [they were]
some 84 years ago when countenanced under Plessy v. Ferguson"
and, accordingly, told Congress that the Justice Department
would oppose "the use of quotas or any other numerical or sta-

47. Cf. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 14 (1958) (describing the futility of

Supreme Court judgments if not supported and enforced by the President and Congress).
48. For overview treatments of Reagan-era affirmative action decisions, see
HERMAN BELz, EQUALITY TRANSFORMED 209-32 (1991); Neal Devins, Affirmative Action After Reagan, 68 TEX. L. REV. 353 (1989); Schwartz, supra note 4.
49. Republican Platform 1980, in NATIONAL PARTY. PLATFORMS OF 1980, at 176,
182 (Donald B. Johnson ed., 1982).
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tistical formula designed to provide to nonvictims of discrimina-

tion preferential treatment. ' 0
Department of Justice efforts to dismantle affirmative action
received, at best, a mixed reception by the Supreme Court. The
Court flatly rejected the Department's absolutist claims that all
race and sex preferences are immoral and illegal, approving a
range of hiring and promotion schemes that benefitted
nonvictims.5 1 At the same time, the Court barred layoffs of senior nonminority employees and state-sponsored nonremedial
set-asides.52
Beyond these mixed outcomes, Reagan-era affirmative action
decisions proved too idiosyncratic to reveal a coherent judicial
approach to the issue of preferences. For starters, some decisions
say very little about the legality of the preference plan under
attack. In Local No. 93, InternationalAssociation of Firefighters
v. City of Cleveland,3 a 1986 decision, the Court approved the
use of affirmative action plans to settle employment discrimination lawsuits governed by Title VII but did not decide whether
the affirmative action plan at issue was outside the bounds of
permissible court-ordered Title VII relief.54 One year later, in
Johnson v. TransportationAgency,55 the Court's approval of a
public employer's affirmative action plan under Title VII was

50. Oversight Hearings on Equal Employment Opportunity and Affirmative Action.
Part 1: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the Comm.
on Education and Labor, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 137 (1981) (statement of William
Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights).
51. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (permitting
the sex of a candidate to be a factor for promotion); United States v. Paradise, 480
U.S. 149 (1987) (ruling that a 50% promotion requirement between blacks and
whites is a constitutionally permissible remedy); Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986) (acknowledging that some
nonvictims may benefit from affirmative action programs); Local 28, Sheet Metal
Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (upholding race-conscious affirmative relief).
52. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (finding
unconstitutional set-asides that were not narrowly tailored); Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (refusing to allow teachers to be laid off based on race
rather than seniority); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561
(1984) (holding that Title VII forbids out-of-turn layoffs based on race).
53. 478 U.S. 501.
54. See id. at 515. For a more detailed treatment of Local No. 93's limits, see
Devins, supra note 48, at 360-65.
55. 480 U.S. 616.
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tempered by the Court's refusal to consider whether the plan
was constitutional.5 6
Other Reagan-era decisions that appeared at first to be
pathbreaking later fizzled when read alongside subsequent decisions. FirefightersLocal Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 7 a 1984 decision that struck down an affirmative action plan that undercut
the seniority rights of nonminority employees, was such a decision. Stotts promised to be the first nail in the affirmative action
coffin, noting in dicta that Title VII's legislative history "made
clear that a court was not authorized to give preferential treatment to non-victims." h Yet, two years later, in Local 28, Sheet
Metal Workers v. EEOC,59 a plurality of the Court formally limited Stott's dicta, holding that a Title VII remedy could establish
hiring goals that benefit nonvictims. ° Sheet Metal Workers' approval of such remedial orders, however, was limited to cases of
"long continued and egregious racial discrimination" and "footdragging resistance" to judicial efforts to enjoin blatant intentional discrimination.6'
Another decision that did not live up to its landmark billing
was 1989's City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,62 which held
that a municipal set-aside plan is unconstitutional unless it
benefits only members of racial groups arguably discriminated
against by the city itself.63 Although the Court subjected such
plans to strict review, its primary objection to the Richmond setaside plan was its arbitrariness,64 a fact that lower courts have
seized upon in approving post-Croson set-aside programs.6 5
56. See id. at 620 n.2. For a more detailed treatment of Johnson's limits, see
Devins, supra note 48, at 365-71.
57. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).

58. Id. at 581.
59. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
60. Id. at 473-74.
61. Id. at 477; see also United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987) (citing
Sheet Metal Workers to support race-conscious constitutional remedies).*
62. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
63. Id. at 503-06.
64. See id. at 506-07. Because Richmond's 30% set-aside failed to set geographic
criteria for minority participants and included minorities such as Eskimos and
Aleuts, who were never victimized in Richmond, the Court found that the set-aside
was "not linked to identified discrimination in any way" and that the city's purpose
was 'outright racial balancing.' Id. at 507.
65. For discussions of lower court interpretations of Croson, see Memorandum
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In the end, Reagan-era affirmative action decisions were incremental in nature, and, consequently, generalizations about
them make little sense. During this period, the Court studiou'sly
avoided grand pronouncements by deciding the cases before it on
the narrowest available grounds. As such, although the Court
was an active player in the affirmative action wars, it provided
little meaningful leadership during the Reagan era.
Even if the Court had spoken more decisively (or at least less
ambiguously), the meaning and reach of its affirmative action
decisions likely would have been controlled by social and political forces."6 The Reagan era, therefore, underscores the inherent limitations on the Court's ability to define public discourse
on issues as emotionally divisive as affirmative action. Croson,
Stotts, and Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education67 illustrate
the transformative role of social and political influences. By
striking down affirmative action plans under some form of
heightened review, all three cases were, in important respects,
victories for the Reagan Justice Department. In the end, however, these decisions were severely limited by strong state and federal government support for affirmative action programs.
from Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger to General Counsels, Re: Adarand
(June 28, 1995), reprinted in 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 125, at D-33 (June 29,
1995) (discussing Croson in light of the Adarand decision) [hereinafter Adarand
Memorandum]; Walter H. Ryland, A Survey and Analysis of Post-Croson Case Law,
in ]ACIAL PREFERENCES IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING 1, 1-48 (Roger Clegg ed.,

1993) (analyzing post-Croson case law and the implications of the cases). For an
argument that lower courts should not read too much into Croson, see Constitutional
Scholars' Statement on Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
98 YALE L.J. 1711 (1989) [hereinafter Constitutional Scholars' Statement] (arguing
that, despite Croson, affirmative action programs are still viable). This statement is
especially instructive in understanding the Clinton Administration's views towards
Croson in particular and the constitutionality of affirmative action in general, for
three of the Statement's signers-Drew Days, Walter Dellinger, and Christopher
Edley-have, as Clinton appointees, played pivotal roles in defining Clinton's affirmative action agenda. See infra notes 157, 219, 222.
66. See infra part II.C (discussing social and political influences on affirmative
action decisions). For a related explanation of why Lochner-era Justices could not
overcome New Deal social and political forces, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 40-43 (1991); ROBERT McCLOsKY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 102-08 (2d ed.

1994); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47
STAN. L. REV. 395, 421-23 (1995).

67. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). For further discussion, see infra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
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Croson and Stotts highlight the critical role that states and
municipalities play as consumers of Supreme Court decisions.
Just as southern resistance to Brown effectively killed off pre1964 Civil Rights Act desegregation efforts," states and municipalities successfully narrowed the potential effect of Croson and
Stotts, sometimes by acting and other times by refusing to
act. 9 Croson, for example, prompted a slew of "'disparity
studies' to prove the likelihood of continuing discrimination in
public contracting and thereby justify the [affirmative action]
programs." ° Although some evidence suggests that some of
these studies were results-driven," most disparity studies have
not, and probably will not, be challenged in court. This fact is
partly a result of the costs of litigation and partly a result of
modifications in affirmative action programs that make them
less vulnerable to constitutional attack. Specifically, as the
Clinton Department of Justice noted in its assessment of
Adarand, post-Croson initiatives "tend to employ flexible numerical goals and/or bidding preferences in which race or ethnicity
is a 'plus' factor... rather than [a] hard set-aside of the sort at
issue in Croson.' 2 In other words, while Croson was not without effect,7 3 states and municipalities could nevertheless side-

68. See GARY ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION 15-32
(1968); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 42-71 (1991); Michael J.
Mlarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7,
85-97 (1994).
69. A handful of states, through Attorney General opinions, did conclude that existing set-aside programs were unconstitutional. See Ryland, supra note 65, at 42
n.172.
70. Adarand Memorandum, supra note 65, at 29; see George R. LaNoue, The Disparity Study Shield. Baltimore and San Francisco, in RACIAL PREFERENCES IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING, supra note 65, at 69, 73 (reporting that, as of 1993, more
than 60 jurisdictions spent $30 million dollars on these studies); George R. LaNoue,
Social Science and Minority "Set-Asides," PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1993, at 49; Dorothy
J. Gaiter, Court Ruling Makes DiscriminationStudies a Hot New Industry, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 13, 1993, at Al.
71. Some studies were reformulated after a preliminary finding of no discrimination, and at least one firm-Peat Marwick-was turned away by some municipalities,
in part because it did not find evidence of discrimination in its study of affirmative
action programs in Miami. See Gaiter, supra note 70.
72. Adarand Memorandum, supra note 65, at 29. See generally Ryland, supra note
65 (analyzing post-Croson decisions).
73. By forcing states and municipalities to restructure their aTrmative action
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step the decision.
The saga of Stotts is an even more vivid illustration of state
and local support of affirmative action. Here, the Reagan Justice
Department turned its Court victory into a devastating defeat.
Declaring Stotts a "slam-dunk" for color blindness, the Civil
Rights Division wasted no time in seeking to eliminate preferences in fifty-one consent decrees. 74 Towards this end, the Justice Department asked states and localities subject to affirmative action obligations under these decrees to join its effort to
reopen cases.7' This

effort

backfired.

Not only was

the

Department's offer rejected almost uniformly, but several mayors and governors roundly criticized the Department.76 Worse
yet, lower federal courts uniformly rejected the Department's
motions to modify existing consent decrees, limiting Stotts to its
facts.77 By the summer of 1986, with the Senate having just
turned down Brad Reynolds's nomination to be Associate Attorney General,78 the post-Stotts campaign proved to be a kamikaze mission that yielded no kills.
Another example of the perils of confrontational strategies is
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.79 Although it invalidated a school board's practice of laying off nonminority employees
ahead of less senior minority employees, Wygant rejected the
Department's absolutist stance that all governmental preferences based on race are unconstitutional."0 Instead, while a plurality of the Court concluded that "any racial classification 'must be
justified by a compelling governmental interest' and that the
means chosen must be "narrowly tailored,"' Wygant recognized

programs, Croson was consequential. Moreover, Croson raised the financial and political costs of affirmative action (the latter because the modified preference program
would have to be reenacted).
74. See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 109 (1991) (quoting Rex Lee).
75. See Stephen Engelberg, Attack on Quotas Opposed by Cities, N.Y. TIMES, May
4, 1985, at Al; Andy Pasztor, Opposition Is Growing to U.S. Attempt To End Hiring
Quotas of Municipalities, WALL ST. J., May 24, 1985, at A8.
76. See Engelberg, supra note 75, at Al; Pasztor, supra note 75, at AS.
77. FRIED, supra note 74, at 109-10.
78. Howard Kurtz, Reynolds' Nomination Voted Down, WASH. POST, June 28, 1985,
at Al.
79. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
80. Id. at 283-84.
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that affirmative action plans grounded in concrete evidence of
prior discrimination will sustain that burden."1 For this reason,
Wygant generally is depicted as a significant Department of
Justice defeat. The Washington Post, the New York Times, and
the Los Angeles Times spoke of Wygant as encouraging to82 and

"a significant victory for civil rights groups" 3 because it "left

the way clear for employers to adopt affirmative action programs
in the workplace." 4
Wygant shows clearly that the Reagan Justice Department
needed only to look in the mirror to face its worst enemy. Not
content to move incrementally by challenging race and gender
preferences, which were especially vulnerable to judicial attack,
the Department unconditionally pursued itg moral crusade
against any and all affirmative action programs.' In other
words, by staking out a hard-line position and pursuing it with
reckless abandon, any judicial approval of affirmative action
could be depicted as a setback to the Department.86 When combined with the Department's failed efforts to restore the taxexempt status of racially discriminatory private schools, as well
as its opposition to bipartisan congressional efforts to make
disparate racial impact an important evidentiary tool in voting
rights cases, the Civil Rights Division weakened the
Department's position with Congress and within the Reagan
Administration. 7
81. Id. at 274 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1980) (plurality opinion)).
82. Stuart Taylor Jr., High Court Bars a Layoff Method Favoring Blacks, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 1986, at Al, A20.
83. Al Kamen, High Court Ruling Signals Support for Affirmative Action, WASH.
POST, May 20, 1986, at Al.
84. Philip Hager & Michael Wines, Layoff Plan Favoring Blacks Voided by the
Court, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1986, at Al. Ironically, these same newspapers characterized Croson as a civil rights disaster, even though Croson did little more than
reaffirm Wygant. For an examination of this press treatment as well as the similarities between the Wygant and Croson decisions, see Devins, supra note 48, at 372-78.
85. See Neal Devins, The Civil Rights Hydra, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1723, 1749-63
(1991).
86. For an analogous argument that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Courtpacking plan undercut the legal policymaking objectives of the New Deal Justice
Department, see Neal Devins, Government Lawyers and the New Deal, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 601 (1996).
87. See Devins, supra note 85, at 1749-63.
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Congress communicated its displeasure with the Justice
Department's arguments through oversight hearings, committee
reports, confirmation votes, and legislation.' Many of these
efforts focused on the Department itself, particularly the rejection of Brad Reynolds as Associate Attorney General, and resulted in numerous oversight hearings.89 Congress also took
aim at federal agencies that questioned race and gender preferences, especially the Civil Rights Commission (CRC), the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC).9" That Congress, particularly the Democratic majority in the House of Representatives,
would oppose the Justice Department's call for color blindness
comes as no surprise. What is surprising is the Department's
limited influence within the executive branch.
The most telling example of the Department's lack of political
clout within the Reagan Administration was its failed attempt to
persuade the White House to modify Executive Order 11,246,

88. For an overview of Congress-Department of Justice relations during this period, see BELZ, supra note 48, at 202-03; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS (1987); .
89. See BELZ, supra note 48, at 202-03. For example, the Justice Department was
taken to task for interfering with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) efforts to defend affirmative action before both the lower federal courts and
the Supreme Court. See Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What
Makes an Independent Agency Independent?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 273, 285-98 (1993).
90. The CRC, in addition to being subjected to an extensive GAO audit, had its
appropriations severely reduced and was directed by Congress to pursue specified
research priorities and to allocate its appropriations internally, according to a restrictive legislative formula. See David Brock, Politicizing the Government's Watchdog,
WALL ST. J., July 16, 1986, at A23; Howard Kurtz, Hill Slashes Funding for Rights
Panel, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 1986, at A12. For the EEOC, its anti-affirmative action
chief of staff, Jeffrey Zuckerman, was turned down for the agency's general counsel
post. Mary Thornton, Senate Rejects EEOC Nomination: Comments on Discrimination
Were Issue, WASH. POST, May 21, 1986, at A23. FCC efforts to rescind the granting
of preferences to minority broadcasters were greeted by the enactment of single-year
funding restrictions forbidding such reconsideration. For a review of this and other
congressional efforts to preserve and expand FCC diversity preferences, see Neal
Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69 TEX. L.
REV. 125, 136-41 (1990). Furthermore, this direct challenge to existing rulemaking,
combined with the FCC's repeal of the fairness doctrine, so poisoned relations between the FCC and Congress that "it stimulated congressional oversight of a magnitude Washington insiders [said was] unprecedented." Micromanagement of the FCC:
Here To Stay?, BROADCASTING, Dec. 26, 1988, at 56.
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which required 325,000 government contractors to adopt affirmative action plans.91 Although Brad Reynolds claimed that the
"[11,246] program is broken and... needs to be fixed in a way
that brings it back in line with the principle of non-discrimination," " pragmatists within the Administration, like Labor Secretary Bill Brock, thought it "politically crazy" for the White
House to expend further political capital in this area. 3 Brock
ultimately prevailed; in August 1986, the White House killed the
proposal "because of recent Supreme Court decisions upholding
some affirmative action plans." 4 That these decisions did not
consider Civil Rights Division objections to the executive order
program did not matter. Rather than view these indeterminate,
fact-specific rulings as being of limited reach, the White House
saw these decisions as a significant political rebuke to the
Department's campaign to put down affirmative action.
The Reagan Administration's willingness to interpret these
Supreme Court decisions broadly, using them as cover to avoid
addressing the merits of the executive order program, demonstrates that the White House thought affirmative action was too
entrenched to oppose. Although the Administration did not pull
the plug on the Justice Department, neither the White House
nor government agencies assisted the Department. Under Reagan, affirmative action proved to be so pervasive "that the very
government agencies of an administration that opposes quotas
and goals report to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on their progress toward meeting affirmative action numerical goals!" 5 The Administration, moreover, did not alter either
the Small Business Administration's or other executive-initiated
set-aside programs or EEOC guidelines providing for an inference of adverse impact whenever the utilization of women and
minorities is less than eighty percent of their availability.96 In-

91. See Gary L. McDowell, Affirmative Inaction, POLY REV., Spring 1989, at 32,
33.
92. MacNeillLehrer News Hour (PBS television broadcast, Mar. 31, 1986).
93. For an insightful account of this episode, see McDowell, supra note 91, at 32.
94. Boyd, supra note 2, at Al.
95. Nathan Glazer, The Affirmative Action Stalemate, PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1988,
at 99, 107.
96. For examinations of the Reagan Administration's mixed record on affirmative
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deed, contrary to Brad Reynolds's claim that "there is no real
justification for tolerating" federal programs that set aside contracts for minority businesses,97 Ronald Reagan told the National Association of Minority Contractors that "this administration has strongly supported programs to provide special assistance to minority businesses." 8
Reagan's not-so-secret support of affirmative action helped
limit Justice Department victories before the Supreme Court
and helped exacerbate Department defeats. Combined with
strong state and congressional support for preferences, Reaganera affirmative action decisions accordingly were narrowed or
expanded to fit into the government's strong support of these
programs. Although social and political forces inevitably will
shape the impact of Supreme Court decisions, the Court's ambiguous, narrow approach towards affirmative action made its decisions especially susceptible to being overtaken by these forces.
Correspondingly, the Court not only limited its own influence
but also undercut the relevance of constitutional interpretation.
Specifically, by failing to play a leadership role in affirmative
action, the Court enabled elected officials to engage in purely
political decisionmaking while claiming to follow Supreme Court
constitutional decisionmaking.
B. The Bush Administration
George Bush campaigned on a platform that promised to follow "in the tradition of Ronald Reagan," including a commitment
to "resist efforts to replace equal rights with discriminatory
quota systems and preferential treatment."9 ' Like President

action, see BELZ, supra note 48, at 181-207; Jeremy Rabkin, How the White House
Got Hooked, Reagan's Secret Quotas, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 5, 1985, at 15.
97. Howard Kurtz, Justice Official Blasts U.S. Set-Aside Contracts: No Real Justification for Programs Seen, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1985, at A25 (quoting Brad
Reynolds).
98. 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 946, 949 (June 27, 1984). The Reagan White
House also opposed a CRC study critical of set-asides. See Howard Kurtz, Civil
Rights Commission Withdraws Its Report on Minority Contracts, WASH. POST, Apr.
12, 1986, at A7.
99. 1988 Republican Party Platform, reprinted in 46 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2369,
2399, 2378 (1988).

1996] -

SUPREME COURT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DECISIONS

691

Reagan, President Bush granted broad discretion to the Department of Justice to oppose affirmative action while other parts of
his administration vigorously supported race and gender preferBush, however, disapproved of the confrontational
ences.'
strategies of the Reagan-era Civil Rights Division and had, as
Reagan's vice president, often advocated positions at odds with
the ideologically driven Justice Department.10 ' Indeed, rather
than seek to reshape the civil rights landscape, the Bush Administration engaged in damage control to distance itself from Reagan-era aftershocks.0 °
In his first month in office, Bush narrowly interpreted City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,' 03 claiming that the "decision
spoke to one set of facts," and emphasized his "commit[mentl to
affirmative action" and, with it, his desire "to see a reinvigorated
Office of Minority Business in Commerce."0 4 Bush also sought
to cool the fires of the Reagan FCC's opposition to affirmative
action. In the summer of 1989, he appointed three FCC Commissioners who expressly supported the granting of race preferences
to minority broadcasters. 5 Before the Supreme Court, these
appointees turned their words into deeds by vigorously (and successfully) defending diversity preferences in Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC.'
The Metro Broadcastinglitigation was telling for another reason. Before the Supreme Court, Bush appointees in the Justice
Department took issue with the FCC position. Characterizing
these preferences as "racial stereotyping that is anathema to

100. For an overview of President Bush's civil rights policies, see STEVEN A. SHOLL,
A KINDLEI% GENTLER RACISM? (1993); Neal Devins', Reagan Redux: Civil Rights Under Bush, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955 (1993); Chester E. Finn, Jr., Quotas and the
Bush Administration, COMMENTARY, Nov. 1991, at 17.
101. See Ruth Marcus, What Does Bush Really Believe?: Civil Rights Record Illustrates Shifts, WASH. PosT, Aug. 18, 1992, at Al.
102. Id.
103. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
104. The President's News Conference, 1 PUB. PAPERS 21, 29 (Jan. 27, 1989).
105. For a discussion of these and other Bush civil rights appointments, see Neal
Devins, The Civil Rights Commission Backslide, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 1990, at A14.
106. See Brief for Federal Communications Commission at 27, Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (No. 89-453) (arguing that diversity preferences
serve the "compelling governmental interests of promoting diversity in broadcasting
programming and remedying discrimination").
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basic constitutional principles," Solicitor General Kenneth Starr
urged the Court to invalidate the FCC program. °7 Congress,
whose support for affirmative action was in full tilt during the
Bush Administration, also participated in the Metro Broadcasting litigation. Through a brief prepared by the Senate's Office of Legal Counsel, Congress countered Department of Justice
claims by defending the FCC preferences as "a measured and
constitutional effort to overcome past inequities and to advance
the legitimate public interest in diversity of programming." °8
By a five-to-four vote, the Supreme Court sided with Congress and the FCC. In approving these programs, the Court did
not demand a finding that the preferences were responsive to
either FCC or societal discrimination. Instead, referring to a
slew of cases upholding FCC regulation of broadcasting to ensure the 'widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources,"" 9 the Court found broadcast diversity "at the very least" an important governmental
objective." 0 Moreover, although neither Congress nor the FCC
ever sought to prove the nexus between minority ownership and
broadcast diversity, the Court claimed to be "required to give
'great weight to the decisions of Congress and the experience of
the Commission."""

107. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8, Metro
Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 547 (No. 89-453). The spectacle of Bush appointees squaring
off before the Supreme Court on a matter as explosive as race preferences appears
bizarre. It is not. FCC appointees needed to satisfy constituencies within Congress.
Justice Department officials were not beholden to that constituency; instead, the
Bush Justice Department maintained its allegiance to the individuals and arguments
of its predecessor. In many respects, the Department of Justice was Bush's calling
card to movement conservatives who figured so prominently in the Reagan revolution. To turn his back on that constituency by ordering the Solicitor General to back
away from the Metro Broadcasting case was unthinkable. For a discussion of the
politics behind the Metro Broadcasting litigation, see Neal Devins, Unitariness and
Independence: Solicitor General Control over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL.
L. REV. 255, 295-96 (1994).
108. Brief of the United States Senate as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents
at 2, Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 547 (No. 89-453).
109. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 567 (quoting Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 570 (quoting Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Natl Comm.,
412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973)).
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Following in the wake of the Court's formal invocation of
strict scrutiny review in Croson, Metro Broadcasting shocked
Congress, the FCC, and the Solicitor General's office." 2 It
shouldn't have, for Metro Broadcastingonce again demonstrated
that Supreme Court affirmative action decisions are not subject
to generalizations. Most obviously, Metro Broadcasting'sbifurcation of state and federal affirmative action programs revealed
that Croson was limited to state and local programs." 3 Furthermore, Metro Broadcasting cannot be extricated from its
political context. Justice Byron White, who consistently had
sided with the Reagan Justice Department in calling for strict
judicial review of affirmative action, provided the critical fifth
vote in Metro Broadcasting.White, however, also was the author
of decisions that the Reagan FCC publicly repudiated as contrary to the First Amendment's marketplace of ideas, and he
held strong beliefs about what he considered the continued correctness of Court decisions upholding FCC authority to regulate
the airwaves in the name of broadcast diversity."' White remained committed to broadcast diversity and, according to Justice William Brennan's personal records, refused to join a
Brennan draft opinion upholding the preferences on remedial
grounds until the majority based its opinion on the continued vitality of diversity-based broadcast regulation." 5 In other
words, rather than serving as some grand statement about
Congress's authority to enact race and gender preferences, Metro
Broadcastingultimately is moored to a questionable application
of First Amendment principles.
The political forces that resulted in the filing of competing
briefs by Congress, the Department of Justice, and the FCC in
Metro Broadcastingwere again at play in deliberations between
Congress and the White House over the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
Specifically, after the Supreme Court agreed with arguments

112. Neal Devins, Congress, the FCC, and the Search for the Public Trustee, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 145, 179.

113. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 565.
114. On Justice White's motivations in Metro Broadcasting, as well as the Reagan
FCC's campaign to discredit broadcast diversity regulations, see Devins, supra note,
112, at 145.
115. See id. at 179.
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made by the Reagan Administration in 1988 and issued five
decisions in 1989 that made it more difficult to prove discrimination under Title VII and other statutes, Congress and civil rights
interest groups went to work on legislation that would both
nullify these decisions and make it easier for civil rights plaintiffs to bring lawsuits."6 For his part, George Bush very much
wanted to strike a deal with civil rights groups. Although an
imbroglio over whether disparate impact proofs of discrimination
would unduly pressure employers to hire by the numbers to
stave off costly litigation prompted a presidential veto and several rounds of marathon negotiations, Bush pressured his negotiators both to meet with civil rights leaders and to find a way for
him to sign a civil rights bill." Ironically, while dissatisfaction
with the Supreme Court prompted this legislation, the key to
the compromise was to delegate to the courts the task of specifying standards of proof governing disparate impact cases."'
C. The Triumph of Social and PoliticalForces
The willingness of Congress and the White House to simultaneously repudiate Court interpretations and delegate
decisionmaking authority to the courts makes clear that social
and political forces may well define the judicial role. Whereas
this outcome is to be expected on statutory matters, such as the
1991 Civil Rights Act, the limits of the Court's constitutional
affirmative action decisionmaking power also have hinged on
elected government action. For example, state and local government support for set-asides has limited Croson's reach. More-

116. See generally Symposium, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Theory and Practice,
68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911 (1993) (discussing the need for and implementation

of the 1991 Civil Rights Act); Symposium, Civil Rights Legislation in the 1990s,
79 CAL. L. REV. 591 (1991) (examining the nature and scope of recent civil rights
legislation).
117. See Ann Devroy, Bush Saw Gains in Deal, Officials Say, WASH. POST, Oct. 26,
1991, at Al; Andrew Rosenthal, Civil Rights Bill Gives Look at White House Split,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1990, at A15. At the same time, Bush and his negotiators were
successful in moderating several key provisions of the 1991 Act, including limits on
damage awards and a requirement that plaintiffs must nearly always demonstrate
the specific practices that caused the disparate impact. See Devins, supra note 100,
at 990-99.
118. See Devins, supra note 100, at 997-98.
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over, Wygant's recognition that nonvictims may benefit from
affirmative action plans helped kill Department of Justice efforts
to rescind Executive Order 11,246.
The bottom line, quite simply, is that Court decisions must
operate within a political culture. Although Court decisions may
affect this culture, social and political forces nonetheless play a
large role in shaping the ultimate meaning of Court action. During the Reagan and Bush Administrations, affirmative action
programs appeared very much entrenched. Despite President
Reagan's rhetoric and his occasional willingness to stand up to
civil rights interests, "group preference policies had spread widely and were deeply entrenched in the political and administrative system" during his presidency.'19 Under President Bush,
affirmative action flourished. No meaningful counteroffensive
was launched, and the President repeatedly bent over backwards to win favor with civil rights groups.120

119. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the
Judiciay, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1995) (statement of Hugh Davis Graham, Professor of American History, Vanderbilt University) [hereinafter Testimony of Hugh
Davis Graham].
120. For example, when black college presidents formally complained to President
Bush about a Solicitor General brief opposing increased financial support to black
colleges, he directed a reversal of that position before the Supreme Court. See Linda
Greenhouse, Bush Reverses U.S. Stance Against Black College Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
22, 1991, at B6. Similarly, to quell an avalanche of protests from higher education
and civil rights groups, Bush reversed a Department of Education ruling that raceexclusive scholarships were illegal. Karen De Witt, U.S. Eases College Aid Stand But
Not All the Way, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1990, at Al. While recognizing that race-specific scholarships may run contrary to the statutory prohibition against recipients of
federal financial assistance discriminating in any program or activity, the President
trivialized this concern as a matter for courts to rule on, stating that "for now ...
we can continue to have these kinds of scholarships." See id. But see Podbersky v.
Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a race-specific scholarship program was not narrowly tailored to remedy past discrimination and was therefore
unconstitutional).
The Bush Administration, however, did not always give in to civil rights interests. As discussed, George Bush used his veto authority to strike a compromise over
the 1991 Civil Rights Act and authorized his Justice Department to fight affirmative
action in court. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text. Moreover, notwithstanding his appointment of the surprisingly liberal David Souter, President Bush's
nomination of Clarence Thomas placed an outspoken opponent of affirmative action
on the Court. See infra note 183. For the most part, however, the Bush Administration worked hard at ducking the civil rights forces that consumed so much of the
Reagan Administration. See generally Devins, supra note 100 (arguing that the Bush
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Bush's attentiveness to civil rights concerns also reveals another obvious lesson: interest groups play a large role in defining
the social and political environment. The Reagan Administration
suffered setbacks for not taking into account the potency of
these interests.' With the backing of Congress and the press,
for example, civil rights interests helped bring down Reagan
Administration efforts to transform the Supreme Court's affirmative action decisionmaking. Of twenty-one "top papers" that
commented on the Supreme Court's partial rejection of Department of Justice arguments in 1986, "only one opposed the use of
affirmative action to remedy discrimination, and seventeen
praised the decisions without any qualifications. " " Congress
struck back both at the Department of Justice and at Reagan's
judicial appointments." When President Reagan nominated
Robert Bork to the Supreme Court, Senate Judiciary Chair and
presidential candidate Joseph Biden (D-Del.) met with the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund, and other civil rights groups to "plot[] strategy."'' 4
The power of civil rights groups, though critically important,
tells only part of the story. For the most part, big business and
labor interests also support affirmative action. In September
1985, Fortune proclaimed that "[b]usinessmen like to hire by the
numbers."'"1 One year later, after the Supreme Court approved
some affirmative action orders, the National Association of Man-

Administration's guiding principle on civil rights was the avoidance of confrontation).
121. The NAACP, National Urban League, American Civil Liberties Union, and
Women's Political Caucus accused the Reagan Administration of "strain[ing]" the
relationship "between the national government and black America" through its "absolutely deplorable" record and "hostility to individual rights." Chester E. Finn, Jr.,
Affirmative Action Under Reagan, COMMENTARY, Apr. 1991, at 17. For an argument
that, although civil rights groups have substantial political power, "it would be a
serious mistake to conclude that racial minorities have achieved full political equality," see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections
on Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CAL. L. REV.
686, 688 (1991).
122. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 525 n.11.
123. See supra notes 88-90.
124. TERRY EASTLAND, ENERGY IN THE EXECUTIVE 246 (1992).
125. Anne B. Fisher, Businessmen Like To Hire by the Numbers, FORTUNE, Sept.
16, 1985, at 26. See generally Note, Rethinking Weber: The Business Response to
Affirmative Action, 102 HARV. L. REV. 658, 659-63 (1989) (arguing that businesses
have become enthusiastic supporters of affirmative action).
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ufacturers breathed a sigh of relief because "it c[ould] ... contin-

ue with affirmative action," and the AFL-CIO applauded the rulings as "a tremendous help to push unions to do more."126 In

1991, representatives of several "Fortune 100" companies
worked with civil rights groups in forging a compromise on civil
rights legislation independent of the White House.127 Business
has many incentives for supporting affirmative action, ranging
from increasing productivity to improving a company's public
image to reducing the risk of litigation for violation of employment discrimination laws.' Whatever the reason, business's
support of affirmative action held steadfast throughout the Reagan and Bush Administrations.
Beyond interest group politics, social forces played a large role
in making affirmative action seem so entrenched during the
Reagan and Bush Administrations. In 1991, Business Week reported that affirmative action is "deeply ingrained in American
corporate culture.... The machinery hums along, nearly auto-

matically, at the largest U.S. corporations." 29 Indeed, "it has
been estimated that over two-thirds of American workers are
covered by affirmative action plans under [Executive Order

126. Peter Perl, Employers, Unions Welcome Decisions, WASH. POST, July 3, 1986,
at Al. Along the same line, the Supreme Court's approval of certain types of voluntary affirmative action plans in Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), reinforced the business community's desire to strengthen affirmative action hiring and
promotion, see BELZ, supra note 48; Note, supra note 125.
127. Gary Lee, Behind Closed Doors, Civil Rights Compromise, WASH. POST, Apr.
10, 1991, at A16. "As a matter of public choice theory," as my colleague Alan Meese
notes, "there is a critical distinction between large, capital intensive businesses and
small, labor intensive businesses. The former will support actions that increase the
price of labor or lower its productivity as a means of disadvantaging their small
rivals, who depend more upon labor." Memorandum from Alan Meese to Neal Devins
(Aug. 25, 1995) (on file with Author). For this reason, small business interests did
not support the 1991 Act. See Joan Biskupic, Job DiscriminationLegislation Roils
Business Community, 49 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 989, 989 (1991) (noting conflict between big and small businesses over the 1991 Act).
128. See BELZ, supra note 48, at 197-98; Note, supra note 125. See generally Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1251 (1995) (discussing why employers may benefit from
voluntary affirmative action programs).
129. Race in the Workplace: Is Affirmative Action Working?, BUS. WK., July 8, 1991,
at 56.
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11,246].""0 Furthermore, although a 1986 study revealed that
eighty percent of whites opposed race preferences in hiring and
promotion,1 3' it was not until 1994 "that a majority of whites
agreed with the idea that 'We have gone too far in pushing equal
rights in this country.""3
With supporters of affirmative action needing only to block
challenges to existing programs, social and political forces were
far too strong for opponents of affirmative action to overcome
this inertia.'33 If anything, during the Reagan and Bush years,
widespread support for affirmative action resulted in an expansion of existing affirmative action programs. 3 4 These forces,
moreover, helped shape the meaning of Supreme Court affirmative action cases, narrowing Stotts and Croson to their facts and
expanding decisions such as Wygant and Sheet Metal Workers
into far-reaching endorsements of nonvictim relief.
All of this is not to say that the Supreme Court does not matter. Croson, for example, has prompted modest reforms of state
and local set-aside programs.'3 5 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court's approval of some affirmative action programs has
strengthened business community support for race- and genderbased hiring and promotion plans.'3 6 Nevertheless, because
Court affirmative action decisions tend to be indecisive, saying
little that cai be generalized beyond the facts of a particular
dispute, social and political forces have played a more dominant

130. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 546.
131. THOMAS B. EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION 186 (1991).
132. Richard Lacayo, A New Push for Blind Justice, TIME, Feb. 20, 1995, at 39, 39
(quoting a 1994 Times Mirror poll). A 1995 poll of 248,000 teenagers revealed growing opposition to affirmative action. "[N]ine out of ten of. . . [those] surveyed say
they oppose affirmative action in hiring and college admission to make up for past
discrimination." William Raspberry, What Actions Are Affirmative?, WASH. POST, Aug.
21, 1995, at A21.
133. For a discussion of this point as well as the application of public choice theory
to the affirmative action debate, see Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate over
Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 893, 917 (1994); Farber & Frickey, supra note
121, at 713-16.
134. See Testimony of Hugh Davis Graham, supra note 119; cf. BELZ, supra note
48, at 207 (describing how the Reagan Administration sought to reform affirmative
action to accomodate employer interests).
135. See supra notes 70-72.
136. See BELZ, supra note 48, at 182; supra notes 125-28.
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role in affirmative action than in other areas.'37 Put simply, for
the Court to play a leadership role on a highly charged issue, it
must write decisions that make it a force to be reckoned with.
Otherwise, the Court risks undercutting its own legitimacy and,
with it, the relevance of constitutional interpretation." 8 Indeed, the willingness of Reagan and Bush officials to treat affirmative action as a purely political issue demonstrates that when
the Court refuses to utter principled and clear pronouncements,
the executive branch and Congress follow the path of least resistance, shirking their responsibility to follow the Constitution
and, instead, give in to potent (if not overwhelming) social and
political forces. This is the lesson of the Reagan and Bush Administrations, and, as Part III will reveal, it is also the lesson of
Adarand.
III. ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. V. PENA

Reagan and Bush Administration acquiescence to affirmative
action, especially to programs that supported minority business
enterprises, contributed to an explosion of legislative and administrative initiatives. By 1994, roughly 160 of these programs had
spread throughout the federal government." 9 Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena4 addressed a challenge to the constitutionality of one of these programs, the STURAA, and its requirement that "not less than 10 percent" of appropriated funds
be set aside for women, members of certain racial groups, and
individuals who could prove both social and economic disadvantage.' Beyond the STURAA set-aside, the Court saw Adarand

137. For a discussion of the Court's ability to shape public discourse, see generally
ROSENBERG, supra note 68 (analyzing competing visions of the Court's role in social
reform); Neal Devins, Judicial Matters, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1027 (1992) (concluding that
The Hollow Hope underestimates the Court's contribution to social reform); Peter
Schuck, Public Law Litigation and Social Reform, 102 YALE L.J. 1763 (1993) (criticizing Rosenberg's theory).
138. See infra part IV.
139. See Memorandum from the American Law Division to Sen. Robert Dole (Feb.
17, 1995), reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. S3930-38 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1995).
140. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
141. Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 10017, 101 Stat. 132, 145 (1987); Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2103. Minority group members
are presumed to be disadvantaged, a presumption that can be rebutted "if a third
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as an opportunity to clarify its position on affirmative action.
Claiming that Metro Broadcasting,Inc. v. FCC' was a departure from the Court's consistent practice of subjecting affirmative action programs to scrutinizing judicial review, the Court
demanded that all race preferences be subjected to "the strictest
judicial scrutiny,"''
thereby overturning Metro Broadcasting's
intermediate review standard for congressionally mandated
affirmative action.'4 4
Adarand's suggestion that, with the exception of Metro Broadcasting, Court affirmative action decisions are cut from the same
cloth is nonsense. Indeed, the Court in Adarand discredited this
claim simply by describing its previous ventures in the affirmative action wars. The Court admitted, for example, that its prior
decisions left "lingering uncertainty in the details."'4 5 Furthermore, the Court stated that its "failure to produce a majority
opinion" before Croson "left unresolved the proper analysis for
remedial race-based governmental action" 4 6 and that the first
time that it returned to the constitutionality of affirmative action after Croson, it issued a decision-Metro Broadcasting-that
was inconsistent with Croson.'4 7 Compounding this image
problem, Adarand refused to rule on the constitutionality of the
STURAA set-aside, noting only that the application of strict
scrutiny review should not be "strict in theory, but fatal in
fact."'48 As such, Adarand is more than the Supreme Court's
most recent entry in the affirmative action chronicles. It is the
culmination of two decades of issue avoidance and failed leadership. Rather than speaking the last word (or even a useful word)
on the constitutionality of affirmative action, the Court still
appears to be making up its mind about the propriety of race
and gender preferences.

party comes forward with evidence suggesting that the participant is not, in fact,
either economically or socially disadvantaged." Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2103. For
further discussion of the STURAA program, see supra note 16.
142. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
143. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111.
144. Id. at 2111-12.
145. Id. at 2111.
146. Id. at 2109.
147. Id. at 2111-13.
148. Id. at 2117 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)).
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This section will expose Adarand as a limited and disingenuous precedent. Its assertions about Metro Broadcasting and
other decisions do not hold up under scrutiny. Although it may
be true that Metro Broadcastingshould have been overruled, the
reason is not, as Adarand suggests, that Metro Broadcasting's
differential treatment of state and federal affirmative action is a
substantial departure from earlier case law." More fundamentally, the Court's refusal to provide any guidance about the application of strict review gives Congress, the White House, and
lower courts a free hand to apply Adarand as they see fit. For
this reason, rather than have Court-imposed constitutional
limitations shape public discourse on affirmative action, social
and political forces will continue to dominate affirmative action
decisionmaking. Consequently, although Adarand may have
been politically expedient, it further reveals the Court's limited
role in defining the affirmative action debate. By placing so few
restraints on elected government action, Adarand frees the way
for elected government to treat affirmative action as a purely
political issue and thereby undermines the Court's institutional
legitimacy.
A. The Road to Adarand
In Adarand, the Court went to great lengths to distinguish
Metro Broadcasting from the corpus of Supreme Court affirmative action decisions. This effort was misleading, for Adarand is
as much a departure from Fullilove v. Klutznick,"5 ° which approved a Carter-era set-aside provision in 1980,151 as it is from
Metro Broadcasting. Furthermore, the STURAA set-aside at
issue in Adarand can be traced directly to Fullilove's approval of
a nearly identical set-aside provision.'52 For this reason,

149. Adarand cites several scholars, including myself, who are critical of Metro
Broadcasting's application of different standards of review to federal and state racial
classifications. Id. at 2115. None of these scholars, however, has claimed that Metro
Broadcasting is a departure from the Court's typical application of strict review to
federal affirmative action.
150. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
151. Id. at 492.
152. Compare id. at 456-63 (discussing the "minority business enterprise" provision
requiring that 10% of materials used in the projects come from minority businesses)
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Fullilove is the critical starting point for an understanding of
both Adarand's factual context and the Court's reasoning in
Adarand.
At issue in Fullilove was Congress's first explicit authorization
of contract set-asides for minority businesses-the Public Works
Employment Act of 1977.1s By requiring that "at least ten per
centum" of public works grants go to businesses "at least 50 per
centum of which" are owned by "citizens... who are Negroes,
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts, " "'
the amendment, in the words of its sponsor, Representative
Parren Mitchell (D-Md.), sought to ensure that "minority businesses [would] get a fair share of the action from this... legislation."'55 Introduced in the House, the Fullilove set-aside generated little debate. 5 ' Indeed, as Clinton Solicitor General
Drew Days, who argued for the Carter Justice Department in
Fullilove, put it: "One can only marvel at the fact that the minority set-aside provision was enacted into law without hearings
or committee reports, and with only token opposition." 5 '
The paucity of Congress's fact-finding did not trouble the Supreme Court. A plurality of the Court relied, instead, on legislative reports, hearings, and the like that, although unrelated to
the Fullilove set-aside, addressed the condition of minority
business.'
In an opinion that Reagan Solicitor General
Charles Fried described as "so narrow and qualified as to be
virtually incomprehensible,"'5 9 the Fullilove plurality, applying
for the first and only time a "most searching examination" standard, concluded that Congress could remedy racial discrimina-

with Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2103 (requiring that 10% of funds be directed toward
disadvantaged small businesses).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1988).
154. Id.
155. 123 CONG. REC. 5327 (1977) (statement of Rep. Mitchell).
156. "Discussion of the provision in the House filled approximately six pages of the
Congressional Record; in the Senate, approximately two pages." Daniel R. Levinson,
A Study of Preferential Treatment: The Evolution of Minority Business Enterprise
Assistance Programs, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 61, 75 (1980).
157. Drew S. Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453, 465 (1987).
158. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 478 (1980) (noting that "Congress had
before it .. . evidence of a long history of marked disparity in the percentage of
public contracts awarded to minority business enterprises").
159. FRIED, supra note 74, at 120.
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tion through affirmative action.16
Fullilove begot hundreds of state and federal set-aside programs. Although the plurality in Fullilove clearly limited itself
to congressional authority, state and local officials extended
Fullilove to suit their needs. By 1989, when the Supreme Court
struck down Richmond's set-aside in Croson, at least 234 jurisdictions had established set-aside programs.' 6' Most of these
mimicked the Fullilove set-aside, providing relief to Eskimos and
Aleuts as well as to Hispanics and African Americans. Congress,
too, viewed Fullilove as a boon to its affirmative action efforts.
Through floor amendments and often without legislative hearings or debate,'62 Congress frequently failed even to pay lip
service to Fullilove's "most searching examination" standard,
perceiving that these set-asides were immunized from constitutional attack.
The STURAA set-aside followed this pattern. Through a
floor amendment to the 1982 Surface Transportation Assistance Act, Congress specified that ten percent of highway and
urban mass transportation funds would be designated for socially and economically disadvantaged business enterprises.'63
In the only statement during debate on the set-aside provision,
Representative Mitchell obliquely referred to the "Supreme
Court in 1980 [upholding] the constitutionality" of set-asides
and noted that "[that is all we are dealing with."'64 Five
years later, when Congress renewed this program, it again
approved a "not less than 10 percent" set-aside. 6 ' This time
around, Congress explicitly incorporated the Small Business

160. Fulilove, 448 U.S. at 491-92.
161. See Testimony of Hugh Davis Graham, supra note 119, at 17; Days, supra
note 157, at 454.
162. See Days, supra note 157, at 457-77; Terry Eastland, The Set-Aside Set, 1Ai.
SPECTATOR, Mar. 1993, at 48 (noting the lack of debate); Thomas W. Lippman, Energizing Minorities' Objectives: Legislation Offers Opportunity for the Incoming Administration, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1992, at A17 (noting that the affirmative action provision in the energy bill "was hardly mentioned in all the months of hearings and
floor debates").
163. 128 CONG. REC. 28927 (1982) (amendment offered by Rep. Mitchell).
164. Id. (statement of Rep. Mitchell).
165. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2103 (1995) (quoting the

STURAA).
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Administration's specification that "members of minority
groups . .. are entitled to a166race-based presumption of social
and economic disadvantage.'
Congress's 1987 enactment differed from its 1982 effort in one
significant respect. Stories of false front companies-those supposedly owned by minorities but actually owned by whites-and
of minority-owned firms that sold contracts won through setaside programs to white-owned firms began to surface in the
early and mid-1980s. 167 Responding to these allegations, Congress held hearings on both set-aside abuse and the ways in
which set-asides had helped minority businesses. 6 ' When the
Senate Environment and Public Works Committee issued its
STURAA report, it pointed to these hearings in concluding that
the STURAA set-aside "is necessary to remedy the discrimination faced by socially and economically disadvantaged persons."'69 Although the STURAA set-aside was not the subject
of floor debates and the Senate Report barely alluded to (let
alone evaluated) allegations of abuse and complaints of reverse
discrimination, Congress did moderate the original 1982 setaside to protect against abuse and reverse discrimination. The
1987 Act, for example, increased the amount of subcontracting
business that nondisadvantaged firms can bid for and placed
limits on disadvantaged businesses' selling their contracts to
nondisadvantaged firms. 7 ° In other words, while Congress's

166. Id. (citing Small Business and Small Disadvantaged Business Concerns, 48
C.F.R. §§ 19.001, 19.073(a)(2) (1994)).
167. See Kenneth B. Noble, Business and the Law: Setbacks for Minority Aid, N.Y.
TIMES, May 18, 1987, at D2; Michael Oreskes, The Set-Aside Scam: Corruption and
Quotas in the Construction Industry, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 24, 1984, at 17, 17; Walter
Shapiro, $4 Billion Worth of Temptation: CorruptionDogs the Set-Aside Programs for
Minority Firms, TIME, June 15, 1987, at 20, 20.
168. See The Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Program of the Federal-Aid Highway Act, Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. on Transportation of the Senate
Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Review of
the 10-Percent Set-Aside Program, Section 105() of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on SBA and SBIC Authority, Minority Enterprise and General Small Business Problems of the House Comm. on Small
Business, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
169. S. REP. No. 4, 11, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 66, 76.
170. See id. at 12-13, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 77.
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fact-finding was limited, the STURAA set-aside was a better
crafted and far more thoroughly deliberated invocation of race
preferences than the set-aside upheld in Fullilove v.
Klutznick.'7 '
B. The Adarand Decision
Adarand paid little attention to the Fullilove plurality, focusing, instead, on Justice Lewis Powell's concurring opinion. Pointing to Powell's claim that Fullilove's "most searching examination"'72 standard was no different from strict scrutiny review,
the Court in Adarand concluded that "[olur action today makes
explicit what Justice Powell thought implicit," namely, that
"federal racial classifications, like those of a State" are subject to
strict review. 73 By recasting Fullilove, Adarand was able to
isolate Metro Broadcasting and its embrace of intermediate
scrutiny review of federal affirmative action programs.
Adarand also gave short shrift to Croson's assiduous efforts to
distinguish state from federal affirmative action. In explaining
why the Richmond set-aside, which was modeled after Fullilove,
should be subject to strict scrutiny review, Croson concluded
that the Fullilove model was inapplicable to state and local setasides.'74 First, Fullilove reflected "'appropriate deference to
the Congress, a co-equal branch""'75 and, more fundamentally,
the branch that is "'expressly charged by the Constitution with
competence and authority to enforce equal protection
guarantees.""76 Second, the Fourteenth Amendment "stemmed
from a distrust of state legislative enactments based on race," a
factor inapplicable to federal enactments. 77

171. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
172. Id. at 491.
173. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995). As an aside,
Adarand also noted that "to the extent (if any) that Fullilove held federal racial
classifications to be subject to a less rigorous standard, it is no longer controlling."

Id.
174. See City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490-91 (1989).
175. Id. at 487 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472).
176. Id. at 488 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 483). For a discussion of this point,
see Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2132-33 (Souter, J., dissenting).
177. Croson, 488 U.S. at 491.
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Metro Broadcasting, unlike Adarand, paid great attention to
Croson's federal-state distinction and to the ambiguity of the
Fullilove plurality's "most searching" scrutiny standard. 7 ' At
the same time, Metro Broadcasting deviated from prior precedents. The Fullilove plurality, for example, neither endorsed nor
rejected strict review as a possible measure of federal affirmative action and did not contemplate the intermediate review
standard utilized in Metro Broadcasting.79 Furthermore,
whereas the Fullilove plurality, as well as the Department of
Justice, which submitted a brief defending the program, took
great pains to defend the set-aside as a "strictly remedial measure" and hence within Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers,' Metro Broadcasting rested exclusively on the broadcast
diversity objectives of the FCC preference.'
Metro Broadcasting'sdeviation from prior precedent, no doubt,
made it a prime candidate for reversal. Adarand, however, incorrectly transformed pre-Metro Broadcastingcase law from a doctrinal muddle into a consistent call for strict review of both state
and federal affirmative action. At the same time, although
Adarand could have conceded the patchwork quality of Supreme
Court affirmative action decisionmaking and still overturned
Metro Broadcasting,Adarand's characterization of Metro Broadcasting as aberrational, though dishonest, is nonetheless sensible. By treating its embrace of strict review as anything but
pathbreaking, Adarand was able to overturn Metro Broadcasting
without raising knotty stare decisis problems. According to the
Court in Adarand, "[r]emaining true to an 'intrinsically sounder'
doctrine established in prior cases better serves the values of

178. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563-64 (1990) (citing
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 491). Justice Stevens's dissent in Adarand attacked the majority for misinterpreting the state-federal distinction made in earlier cases. See
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2123-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179. A majority of Justices in Fullilove pointed to strict review as a possible measure of federal affirmative action. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 492; id. at 518-19 (Marshall,
J., concurring). Only three members of the Court in Fullilove embraced intermediate
review. See id. at 517-19 (Marshall, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 481; see also Brief for the Secretary of Commerce, Fullilove, 448 U.S.
448 (No. 78-1007) (noting at least 23 times the remedial nature of the Fullilove setaside).
181. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 579.
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case
stare decisis than would following a more recently decided
182
inconsistent with the decisions that came before it."

What is most remarkable is that, with all its doctrinal gyrations, Adarand has such limited practical consequences. To begin with, the retirement of four of Metro Broadcasting's fivemember majority and the corresponding appointment of at least
one staunch affirmative action critic, Clarence Thomas, ensured
some tightening of the Metro Broadcasting standard."m The
only question was how much. In a sense, by remanding the case
rather than subjecting the STURAA preference to strict scrutiny
review, Adarand does not answer that question. By treating
Metro Broadcastingas an aberration from an otherwise unitary
body of decisionmaking, however, Adarand signals its support of
the status quo ante. 84 Along these lines, Adarand, if anything,
places another nail in the coffin of the Reagan-Bush Department
of Justice campaign for victim-specific relief. By taking the result of Fullilove as a given, recognizing that "government is not
disqualified from acting in response" "[to] both the practice and
the lingering effects of racial discrimination"' s and "dispel[ling] the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but
fatal in fact""' 86 Adarand distanced itself from absolutist arguments that "government can never have a 'compelling interest'
in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for
past racial discrimination in the opposite direction."'' 7 Indeed,
182. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2115.
183. Thomas, when chair of the EEOC under Reagan, told Congress that numerically based remedies "have the potential to undermine the ultimate goals of nondiscrimination" and "can lead to a perception that women and minorities need
preferential treatment to compete even after the discrimination has ended." Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission Policies Regarding Goals and Timetables in
Litigation Remedies 1986: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26
(1986); see also Juan Williams, A Question of Fairness, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb.

1987, at 70 (discussing Thomas's position on affirmative action as chairman of the
EEOC).
184. This claim is the centerpiece of Justice Ginsburg's dissent. Adarand, 115 S.
Ct. at 2134 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("I write separately to underscore ... the
considerable field of agreement-the common understanding and concerns-revealed
in opinions that together speak for a majority of the Court.").
185. Id. at 2117.
186. Id. (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)).
187. Id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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no evidence suggests that either the STURAA set-aside remanded in Adarand or the diversity preference upheld in Metro are
doomed as a result of Adarand.
The STURAA set-aside, without question, is on stronger con8
stitutional footing than the set-aside approved in Fullilove."'
Its stated purpose-to remedy discrimination-is more compelling than the "fair share" arguments made by the sponsor of the
8 9 The STURAA set-aside also includes limFullilove set-aside."
ited safeguards to protect against abuse and to protect the interests of both disadvantaged nonminorities and the
nondisadvantaged: eligibility is limited to the disadvantaged, including nonminorities who can demonstrate both social and
economic disadvantage; nondisadvantaged minorities are ineligible; contracts awarded to disadvantaged businesses cannot be
brokered to nondisadvantaged firms; and bidding requirements
are designed to protect nondisadvantaged firms from bearing a
disproportionate burden. 9 ° While this fine tuning of Fullilove's
blanket grant of eligibility to any and all members of designated
minority groups does not ensure that the STURAA set-aside will
survive strict review, 9 ' Adarand does not come close to sealing
the fate of this program.
The FCC diversity preference, although a tougher sell, may
also survive the Adarand decision. For starters, Adarand does
not comment on whether broadcast diversity and other
Justice Thomas also advanced this victim-specific model in a separate concurrence.
See id. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
("There can be no doubt that the paternalism that appears to lie at the heart of
this program is at war with the principle of inherent equality that underlies and infuses our Constitution.").
188. Adarand, while not disturbing Fullilove, does not comment on "whether the
program upheld in Fullilove would survive strict scrutiny as our more recent cases
have defined it." Id. at 2117. This comment is truly remarkable, for it further demonstrates the disingenuity of Adarand's claim that Metro Broadcasting is the only
deviation from the Court's otherwise consistent approach to affirmative action.
189. See 123 CONG. REC. 5327 (1977). The Fullilove plurality, however, assumed
that the set-aside served remedial objectives. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 483-84.
190. See supra notes 16, 169-70. For a detailed treatment of why the STURAA setaside is constitutional, see Brief for the Respondents, supra note 24, at 43; Brief of
the Congressional Black Caucus as Amicus Curiae, Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2907 (No.
93-1841).
191. See generally Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 21, at 33 (arguing that the
STURAA set-aside cannot survive strict review).
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nonremedial objectives remain a legitimate basis for affirmative
action.'92 Furthermore, the FCC preference is not merely an
attempt to increase broadcast diversity caused by the
underrepresentation of minority broadcast license holders. Congressional and related FCC action in the late 1970s and early
1980s revealed that the preference is a remedial link to FCC
diversity objectives; specifically, because underrepresentation of
minority owners stems from societal discrimination, the FCC
must remedy that discrimination as a means to the end of program diversity.'93 To the extent that the diversity preference
operates as no more than a "plus" in comparing the relative
merits of competing applications for a broadcast license,1

94

it

certainly is conceivable that the FCC preference could be upheld
as a relatively inobtrusive way of advancing a compelling governmental interest.'95

192. While finding the Court's silence on this matter highly probative, the Clinton
Department of Justice's review of Adarand reached no conclusions about "whether
and in what settings nonremedial objectives can constitute a compelling interest."
Adarand Memorandum, supra note 65, at 14. Nonremedial preferences may be permissible, therefore, because Adarand does not overrule Justice Powell's conclusion in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), that diversity
preferences in university admissions are constitutionally permissible, see Bakke, 438
U.S. at 311-19; Adarand Memorandum, supra note 65, at 14-16. Furthermore,
Adarand's author, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, previously has signaled her possible support of nonremedial affirmative action. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267, 288 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
193. For a detailed examination of the remedial justification for the FCC preference, see Devins, supra note 112, at 150-55.
194. One of the two programs upheld in Metro Broadcasting operated this way.
Under this program, a broadcaster's past broadcast record, the proposed program
service, and owner participation in station operations also were factors. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 557 (1990). Race was dispositive in the second
program, a "distress sale" policy that allowed FCC-approved minority broadcasters to
purchase stations at a distress price from broadcasters whose qualifications were
called into question. See id. at 552.
195. Some chance remains that the FCC may moderate the diversity preference
programs that it successfully defended in Metro Broadcasting. In response to
Adarand, the Commission no longer utilizes race and gender preferences when
awarding licenses to provide personal communications services such as wireless telephone and wireless facsimile. Entrepreneur's Block Auction May Proceed, Appeals
Court Says, 1995 Daily Rep. Execs. (BNA) No. 190, at A-18 (Oct. 2, 1995). Instead,
the Commission now provides preferences to all small businesses, regardless of the
owner's race or gender. See id. Whether this change in policy signals more far-reach-
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That the FCC and STURAA programs may withstand postAdarand review makes clear that the Court in Adarand went to
great lengths to craft a decision that, at best, offers limited guidance. The Court's sidestepping in Adarand also suggests that
social and political forces play a large role in shaping Court
decisionmaking. In particular, Adarand's middle-ground solution, by simultaneously embracing strict review and making
clear that federal affirmative action may be constitutional under
this standard, matches public opinion and gives the government
a free hand to debate the issue of preferences.'9 6 Like its middle-ground solution to the abortion issue in Planned Parenthood
v. Casey,' Adarand allows the Court to appear to take a
stand on a divisive and emotionally charged issue without risking severe political repercussions. Moreover, like Casey's substitution of an opaque undue burden standard of review for Roe's
stringent, but easily applied, trimester standard, Adarand rejects Metro Broadcasting's straightforward, albeit deferential,
standard of review in favor of an ill-defined version of strict
review.'9 8 Accordingly, just as Casey returned much of the
abortion issue to elected government, Adarand likewise leaves it
to elected government to sort out acceptable race and gender
preferences from unacceptable ones.'99 In so doing, the Court

ing reforms is unclear. Unlike in personal communications services, a supposed nexus exists between broadcast diversityd and the preferences upheld in Metro Broadcasting. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
196. See Jack Germond & Jules Witcover, On Politics: Affirmative Action Ruling
Raises Stakes on the Issue, BALT. EVENING SUN, June 14, 1995, at 2A.
197. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (reaffirming Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), but
rejecting its stringent trimester standard in favor of a less demanding undue burden
standard).
198. Adarand and Casey also make use of highly suspect stare decisis analysis.
Adarand misstates precedent in order to isolate Metro Broadcasting.See supra note
182 and accompanying text. Casey separates Roe's holding that a woman has a constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy (which is entitled to stare decisis protection) from Roe's trimester standard of review, which the Court claimed was not
an essential part of the Roe holding and therefore not entitled to stare decisis protection. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2818. At the same time, unlike in its abortion cases,
the Court never has embraced an absolutist approach towards affirmative action. For
this reason, stare decisis concerns of institutional legitimacy (which loomed so large
in Casey's reaffirmation of Roe) played no role in Adarand's overturning of Metro
Broadcasting.
199. In the case of abortion, nearly all state legislatures have declined to use their
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has returned home to its ambiguous fact-specific approach to
affirmative action, eschewing the clarity of absolutist approaches
in favor of the resulting murkiness-the "dank, miasmic, myxomycetous sump." 00
C. Adarand and the Ongoing Debate over Affirmative Action
Even before its June 1995 release, Adarand had been largely
overtaken by social and political forces. For example, in the
spring of 1995, Congress was considering a bill introduced by
Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) entitled the "Act to End Unfair
Preferential Treatment";2 1 the White House was in the midst
of an extensive review of federal affirmative action programs;
announced and prospective presidential candidates-including
Bob Dole, Phil Gramm, Jesse Jackson, Arlen Specter, and Pete
Wilson-had made affirmative action one of the centerpieces of
their presidential bids; and a citizen-sponsored ballot initiative
in California threatened to do away with most state affirmative
action programs, including public employment and contracting
programs." 2 By May 1995, "[tlhe question of the hour" was not
whether the Supreme Court would settle the affirmative action
controversy "but simply whether it [would] stand aside and let
the nation sort through these problems on its own."2 3
By saying so little, Adarand ensured that elected officials will
continue to dominate this ongoing debate over preferences. Furenhanced authority to enact abortion restrictions. For a summary and tentative assessment of state practices after Casey, see Neal Devins, The Countermajoritarian
Paradox, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1433, 1453-55 (1995) (exploring states' reluctance to enact
antiabortion measures).
200. The quotation is borrowed from Charles Galvin, More on Boris Bittker and the
Comprehensive Tax Base: The Practicalitiesof Tax Reform and the ABA's CSTR, in
B. BrIrKER ET AL., A COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAX BASE? 89 (1968).

201. S. 497, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
202. William Claiborne, Chipping at a Democratic Cornerstone: California Party
Leaders Consider Compromise on Affirmative Action, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1995, at
Al. Considerable doubt remains whether the California initiative will qualify for the
1996 ballot. On December 1, 1995, the Los Angeles Times suggested that the initiative campaign "was not adequately focused on the immediate need to gather at least
690,000 signatures to qualify for next November's ballot." Dave Lesher, UC Regent
To Take Over Initiative Campaign Against Affirmative Action, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 1,
1995, at A42.
203. Jeremy A. Rabkin, The Color of California, AM. SPECTATOR, May 1995, at 24.
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thermore, because it could take at least two years for the Supreme Court "to find a case it can use to fill in the outlines of'
Adarand, the Court will not likely reenter this fray until after
the 1996 elections." 4 Indeed, Adarand effectively makes the
1996 presidential elections a referendum on affirmative action.
With President Clinton strongly supporting preferences and the
leading Republican candidates lined up against affirmative action, one or two Supreme Court appointments could either tighten or eviscerate the strict scrutiny standard adopted by
Adarand's five-member majority.0 5 As such, Adarand reinforces the purely political nature of affirmative action
decisionmaking, thereby undermining the Court's authority and
the Constitution's relevance.
This is not to say that Adarand is irrelevant to public discourse on affirmative action. Having arrived on the crest of a
tidal wave of attention being given to affirmative action,
Adarand has been discussed ad nauseum by the President and
his legal advisors, hordes of congressmen and senators, and
nearly every policy wonk and syndicated columnist. Adarand,
however, is so malleable as to be almost beside the point. Proponents of affirmative action spin it to mean one thing; opponents
spin it to mean something entirely different.
A vivid illustration of this phenomenon occurred in July 1995,
when Senator Phil Gramm (R-Tex.) proposed eliminating setasides for minorities and women in federal contracting. 6 In
defending this measure, Gramm claimed that Adarand supported the Reagan-Bush view that race-conscious relief should be
204. Greenhouse, supra note 37, at Al, A17. The Court's silence may well be intentional. By reserving a decision on its application of strict review, Adarand enables
the Court to fine tune its decisions at a later date-once the ongoing conflagration
over affirmative action has quieted, if not settled.
205. For this reason, I am unwilling to read very much into Supreme Court decisions, issued within a month of Adarand, limiting race-conscious electoral districts.
See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (holding that Georgia lacked a
compelling interest to use racial gerrymandering to create a black majority congressional district); United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995) (holding that a plaintiff who does not reside in a gerrymandered district lacks standing to sue the state).
While the Court may be signaling an increasing discomfort with race-conscious
decisionmaking, Adarand is simply too indeterminate and too vulnerable to support
any larger claims about the future of judicial scrutiny of affirmative action.
206. 141 CONG. REC. S10,401 (daily ed. July 20, 1995) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
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limited to the victims of discrimination. Gramm explained that
"[m]y amendment is written in total conformity with
Adarand.... That is, if the court finds that a contractor was
[personally] subject to discrimination, the court may provide a
remedy with a set-aside.... 2 "7 In sharp contrast, Senator
Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) called attention to Adarand's recognition
that the government may act in response to 'both the practice
and the lingering effects of racial discrimination."'2 " Along
these lines, affirmative action supporters have found Adarand to
be "helpful in shifting the terms of the debate on affirmative
action in Congress."0 9 Specifically, with Adarand's demand
that federal affirmative action programs satisfy strict review,
elected officials can express skepticism about the propriety of
preferences while passing the affirmative action buck back to
the courts. For example, Senator Patty Murray (D-Wash.), confident that the Clinton Administration would narrowly interpret
Adarand, countered Gramm's efforts by proposing that federal
funds can only be used for "programs ... completely consistent
2 10
with the Supreme Court's recent decision in... Adarand."
In so doing, Murray made Gramm's bill appear extreme, going
2 ' When all was said and done, the
well beyond Adarand.
Murray amendment was approved by a lopsided eighty-four to
thirteen vote and the Gramm amendment was soundly defeated
by a bipartisan sixty-one to thirty-six vote. 12
207. Id. at S10,408 (statement of Sen. Gramm).
208. Id. at S10,409 (statement of Sen. Specter) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995)). In response to Specter, Gramm made clear
that his "objective [was] not to ratify the Adarand ruling" but to "end set-asides." Id.
at S10,410 (statement of Sen. Gramm). Gramm also has said that, if elected president, he would repeal the executive order that Reagan left in place. See James
Srodes, The Maverick, FIN. WORLD, Aug. 29, 1995, at 66.
209. Steven A. Holmes, Affirmative Reaction: For the Civil Rights Movement, a New
Reason for Living, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1995, § 4, at 1.
210. 141 CONG. REC. S10,405 (daily ed. July 20, 1995) (statement of Sen. Murray).
211. Bob Dole's recent proposal to eliminate most federal affirmative action programs also goes well beyond Adarand's demands. As one of Senator Dole's staff
members stated: "The fact that an [afirmative action program may be] constitutional
does not make it wise public policy." Kevin Merida, Dole Aims at Affirnative Action,
WASH. POST, July 28, 1995, at A10.
212. See Kevin Merida, Senate Rejects Gramrn Bid To Bar Affirmative Action SetAsides, WASH. POST, July 21, 1995, at A13. This margin of defeat may have been
exacerbated by Dole supporters who voted against the amendment, in part, to em-
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The defeat of the Gramm amendment reveals that reports of
the death of affirmative action, like earlier reports of the demise
of the Reagan Justice Department's challenge to preferences, are
greatly exaggerated. Several key Republican legislators, including House Republican Conference Chair John Boehner (R-Ohio),
Republican Policy Committee Chair Don Nickles (R-Okla.), and
House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.), have launched a concerted effort to push affirmative action to the back burner.213 Motivated both by a desire "to craft a positive message for minorities
before trying to dismantle affirmative action" and a corresponding fear that a catfight over affirmative action may undermine
the pursuit of the Contract with America,214 the Republican
Party may not be ready to do battle over affirmative action.
Along the same lines, "more than a dozen" Republican governors
have said that "they hoped the GOP nominee [for President]
would not make affirmative action a major issue in the 1996
' In other words, although the 1994 elections promelection."215
ised a sea of reforms, affirmative action may prove too ento be overcome (at least until the 1996 elections, if at
trenched
6
21

all).

Interest group politics also has played a role in the Clinton
Administration's defense of affirmative action. Concerned that
Jesse Jackson would harm President Clinton's reelection efforts,1 7 the White House sought to shore up its minority base
and neutralize Jackson through its vigorous public support of
affirmative action.218 As part of this effort, the executive

barrass Gramm. See Steven A. Holmes, Senate Rejects Effort To End Preference Programs, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1995, at A7.

213. See Merida, supra note 212, at A13.
214. Id.
215. David S. Broder & Robert A. Barnes, Few Governors Join Attack on Racial
Politics, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 1995, at Al.

216. Consider, for example, the American Bar Association's August 9, 1995, decision
to endorse affirmative action programs that "eliminate or prevent discrimination."
See Saundra Toffy, ABA Body Backs Endorsement of Affirmative Action, WASH.
POST, Aug. 10, 1995, at A3.
217. See Paul Richter, Democrats Listen for Tick of Jesse Jackson Time Bomb, LA.
TIMES, July 18, 1995, at Al.
218. President Clinton's support for affirmative action is not without qualification.
For example, in response to claims that his first choice to head the Justice
Department's Civil Rights Division, Lani Guinier, was a "quota queen," Clinton with-
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branch has spun Adarand to fit its needs, limiting Adarand's
reach through White House and Justice Department assessments of the decision. Through a White House-conducted "Affirmative Action Review," the Clinton Administration concluded
that nearly all affirmative action programs are responsive to
discrimination, do not unduly burden nonminorities, and accomplish their objectives of increasing opportunities for minorities
and women. 19 Beyond creating the factual predicate to support
the constitutionality of existing affirmative action programs, °
the Clinton White House also made clear its views on the meaning of Adarand.In a July 19, 1995, speech on affirmative action,
Clinton "emphasize[d] that the Adarand decision did not dismantle affirmative action and did not dismantle set-asides. In
fact,.., it actually reaffirmed the need for affirmative action
and reaffirmed the continuing existence of systematic discrimination in the United States."'
drew the nomination, claiming that Guinier's writings "lend themselves to interpretations that do not represent the views that I expressed on civil rights during my
campaign." Michael Isikoff, Readings in Controversy: Guinier's Pivotal Articles, WASH.
POST, June 4, 1993, at A10.
219. Although noting that its conclusions "must be considered tentative and provisional" because of the intervening Adarand decision, the "Affirmative Action Review"
found that federal affirmative action programs are both responsive "to the lingering
biases and the poisons of prejudice" and "fair-i.e., no unqualified person can be
preferred over another qualified person in the name of affirmative action . . . [and
that preferential] measures will be transitional." Text of "Affirmative Action Review"
Report to President Clinton Released July 19, 1995, reprinted in 1995 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 139, at D-30 (July 20, 1995) [hereinafter Affirmative Action Review
Report]. This review was conducted by Christopher Edley, Jr., who was a committed
supporter of affirmative action before joining the Clinton Administration. See Constitutional Scholars' Statement, supra note 65, at 1715 (listing Edley as one of its
signers).
220. I do not mean to suggest that no executive department or agency will modify
existing affirmative action programs as part of this review process. At the least, the
Department of Defense has rescinded its so-called "rule of two" set-aside policy for
disadvantaged business enterprises. DOD Suspends Use of "Rule of Two" Set-Asides
for SDBs in Light of Adarand-MandatedReview, 64 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 368 (Oct.
30, 1995). Under this rule, prime contracts were set'aside for disadvantaged businesses whenever two or more disadvantaged firms were available and qualified to
bid. See id. Although it has repealed the "nile of two," the Department of Defense
still makes use of race-conscious affirmative action to meet congressionally mandated
goals. See id. As of December 12, 1995, six months after Adarand, no other executive agency or department had announced significant revisions to existing affirmative action programs.
221. Statement by President Clinton at the National Archives and Records Admin-

716

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:673

2
Through a June 28, 1995, Office of Legal Counsel opinion,
the Department of Justice also limited Adarand's reach. Emphasizing the Court's rejection of "strict in theory, but fatal in
fact" review and its related determination that "the lingering
effects of racial discrimination" may justify race-based remedial
measures, 2 the Office of Legal Counsel opinion, especially
when read in conjunction with the White House's narrow interpretation of Adarand, provides a legal justification for supporters of race and gender preferences to preserve existing affimative action programs. In particular, the opinion notes that
'
including: whether
Adarand "leaves many questions open,"224
there must be evidence of discrimination to establish a compelling governmental interest; whether the federal government will
be held accountable to Croson or some other version of strict
review; whether congressionally prescribed affirmative action
will be treated any differently from agency-initiated programs;
whether affirmative action programs can be grounded in
nonremedial objectives; and whether the government must consider race-neutral alternatives." To muddy the waters even

istration, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1255, 1262 (July 19, 1995).
222. See Adarand Memorandum, supra note 65. The Office of Legal Counsel typically is engaged in the business of resolving legal disputes within the executive
branch. For the most part, this task involves a determination of which one of two
competing legal interpretations is correct. See generally Symposium, Executive Branch
Interpretation of the Law, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 21 (1993) (collecting articles and
commentary on the Attorney General's opinion function and the Office of Legal
Counsel). To issue a descriptive memorandum about the uncertain application of a
Supreme Court affirmative action decision, particularly when the Civil Rights Division has subject matter jurisdiction over affirmative action, is quite unusual. At the
same time, it is sensible that an opinion be written to stave off agency general
counsel interpretations inconsistent with administration objectives. See infra note
225. Given the Office of Legal Counsel's role in resolving agency legal disputes and
the partisan reputation of the Civil Rights Division, it is also sensible that the
Clinton Administration would seek an Office of Legal Counsel memorandum on
Adarand, especially because the head of that office, Walter Dellinger, is a committed
supporter of affirmative action. See Constitutional Scholars' Statement, supra note 65,
at 1715 (listing Dellinger as signer of statement).
223. Adarand Memorandum, supra note 65, at 1.
224. Id.
225. See id. By creating, rather than answering, questions about Adarand, the
Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum preserved political flexibility for the President,
allowing him to fill in the gaps identified by the Memorandum. In other words, had
President Clinton elected to cut back federal affirmative action programs, the Office
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further, the opinion suggests that lower court interpretations of
Croson are too indeterminate to resolve the proper application of
the Croson standard, assuming, that is, that Croson is even
applicable. 6 Finally, the opinion contains a four-page appendix of questions that, depending on how lower courts sort out the
issues that the Supreme Court did not address in Adarand, may
or may not be relevant to assessing the validity of federal affirmative action programs.2 27 By identifying Adarand's uncertain
status, the Office of Legal Counsel opinion sounds a cautionary
message to agency general counsels that "n]o affirmative action
program should be suspended prior to" an evaluation of the
program's constitutionality."
Nothing about the Office of Legal Counsel's opinion is unreasonable or unseemly.' The fact that affirmative action supporters and opponents have announced competing visions of
Adarand also is neither surprising nor problematic. Indeed, it is
inevitable that affirmative action decisions will, if possible, be
interpreted to advance partisan objectives. In the case of
Adarand, the Court's utter failure to communicate how strict
review works simply creates a broader range of interpretive

of Legal Counsel Memorandum would not have proven a barrier to such an expansive reading of Adarand. My thanks to John McGinnis, former Deputy Assistant
Attorney General at the Office of Legal Counsel, for this insight.
226. See id. at 28-34. The Office of Legal Counsel usually does not rely on lower
court rulings in its interpretation of a Supreme Court decision. In this instance,
attention to lower court rulings was consistent with the Clinton Administration's
objective of protecting against expansive interpretations of Adarand.
227. See id. at 35-38.
228. Id. at 34. Given the President's embrace of affirmative action and the Office of
Legal Counsel's failure to set forth a standard by which the administration believes
affirmative action should be judged, it is highly doubtful that any agency general
counsel will propose the dismantling of existing affirmative action programs. Inflexible race-based quotas, however, appear to be taboo to the administration. See Affirmative Action Review Report, supra note 219. Hardly any of these programs exist,
however. For example, set-aside programs such as STURAA almost always include
mechanisms allowing for nonminority participation, challenges to minority participation, and adjustments to the set-aside target. See id. At the same time, consistent
with the administration's "mend it, don't end it" rhetoric, some affirmative action
programs may be adjusted at the margins.
229. While the Office of Legal Counsel may be obligated to issue opinions that are
faithful to Supreme Court decisions, the Adarand Memorandum highlights rather
than misstates the indeterminate nature of the Court's decision.
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possibilities. As such, Adarand places very few constraints on its
interpreters. Depending on the outcome they desire, Adarand
interpreters can treat the case as decisive or irrelevant, as a
reaffirmation or repudiation of affirmative action.
IV. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE

JUDICIAL ROLE IN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DECISIONMAIUNG
Two decades ago, in DeFunis v. Odegaard,"° the Supreme
Court issued its first nondecision in an affirmative action case.
Rather than play a leadership role and define the parameters of
government authority over race preferences, the Court ducked
the issue altogether by ruling the DeFunis lawsuit mootY
When the Court finally spoke, in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke," it issued a decision so fractured that no
member of the Court joined Justice Lewis Powell's decisive lead
opinionY Symposia were held to sort out what all this meant,
whose opinion controlled, how the case should be applied,
whether it was a principled decision, et cetera.'
As this Essay has demonstrated, this pattern continues. The
Supreme Court has not used its bully pulpit to speak about the
rightness or wrongness of preferences. Unlike abortion, school
desegregation, the death penalty, school prayer, and a host of
other emotionally charged issues, the Court has not played a
leadership role in affirmative action. Its decisions are fact-specific, plurality decisions far outnumber majority decisions, and the
values that underlie the Court's rulings are, at best, hard to
decipher. Admittedly, this division reflects the public's division
and lack of consensus on the affirmative action issue. Nonethe230. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
231. Id. at 315-16. DeFunis, who challenged a law school affirmative action admissions program, had attended and graduated from another law school during the
course of litigation. See id. As it had done one year earlier in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), the Court could have resolved the dispute by finding DeFunis's
challenge "capable of repetition yet evading review.'" Id. at 125 (quoting Southern
Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)).
232. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
233. For an exceptional accounting of the Bakke litigation, see JOHN C. JEFFRIES,
JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. A BIOGRAPHY 455-501 (1994).
234. See, e.g., De Funis Symposium, 75 COLUlTJ.
L. REV. 483 (1975); Symposium,
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1979).
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less, by not staking out a position, the Court has played next to
no role in shaping public discourse on affirmative action. In
contrast, on issues like abortion and school desegregation, the
Court has proved itself a player, shaping policy through decisions that have had a nationwide impact."
Adarand exemplifies the Court's limited influence in settling
(or even defining) the affirmative action debatesY 6 Without
guidance on how the Court's strict review standard should be
applied, Congress and the White House are free to do with the
decision as they see fit. The competing approaches of affirmative
action supporters, opponents, and moderates who have yet to
(and may never) stake out a position makes clear that Adarand
is an extraordinarily malleable opinion. While social and political forces typically play a part in defining the reaches of Supreme Court decisionmaking, Court decisions often play a large
role in shaping constitutional and other dialogues that take
place among the branches. 7 Adarand, in contrast, places few
meaningful checks on elected government action. Affirmative
action supporters claim that the decision "reaffirmed the need
for affirmative action"; s opponents claim that, after Adarand,
only the actual victims of discrimination can obtain race-conscious relief. 9
What is truly amazing is that the Court keeps telling us that

235. See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 68 (discussing the role of federal courts
in producing political and social changes in civil and women's rights); Devins, supra

note 137 (arguing that federal courts play a significant role in shaping public values); Schuck, supra note 137 (reviewing books that explore the role of federal courts
in legal reform).
236. While Bakke, Croson, and Adarand express judicial skepticism about quotas
and set-asides, overwhelming social and political forces also oppose these rigid affirmative action programs. For example, civil rights leaders, Democrats sponsoring the

1991 Civil Rights Act, and the Clinton White House all have joined the chorus in
opposition to inflexible preferences. Indeed, President Clinton's withdrawal of Lani
Guinier's nomination to head the Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division was
largely rooted in anti-quota sentiment. See supra note 218.
237. See FISHER, supra note 44; LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1996); Neal Devins, Foreward to Symposium,
Elected Branch Influences in Constitutional Decisionmaking, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 1.
238. Statement by President Clinton at the National Archives and Records Administration, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1255, 1262 (July 19, 1995).
239. See supra note 202.
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it matters and that, for the most part, lawyers, law professors,
and journalists agree. In Adarand, for example, the Court spoke
of establishing "general propositions with respect to governmental racial classifications," and, to develop this declaration, overruled Metro Broadcastingbecause it deviated from these propositions.2 40 As this Essay has shown, however, saying that "you
matter" and actually shaping public discourse and elected government action are quite different things.
The Supreme Court should matter. In our three-branch
scheme, the Supreme Court is expected to shape constitutional
values and, in so doing, preserve the judiciary's integrity as a
coequal branch of government. Along these lines, the Federalist
Papers, in supporting the Court's authority to strike down governmental conduct, spoke of the judicial branch as serving as
"an intermediate body between the People and the Legislature,
in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits
assigned to their authority." '41 When it comes to affirmative
action, however, the Court has failed to speak in a way that
alters the political forces. It has neither defined the terms of the
affirmative action debate particularly well nor used its bully
pulpit to explain what values are at stake. Narrow holdings,
refusals to consider constitutional issues, and deployment of
mootness, remand, and other doctrines of judicial restraint are
the hallmark of the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence. As
a result, although it is often true that "speaking no more broadly
than is absolutely required avoids throwing settled law into
confusion; doing so [on affirmative action] preserves a chaos that
is evident to anyone who can read and count." 42
There is no reason to think this practice will change. After
twenty years of ducking the issue, the Court, rather than "estab' has issued a decision that
lish[ing] ... general propositions, 243
is at once indeterminate and disingenuous. These actions engender in the political branches a belief that the Constitution is
infinitely malleable. Consequently, rather than debate the mer240. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2111 (1995).
241. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 542 (Alexander Hamilton) (H.B. Dawson ed., 1863).
242. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 535 (1989.) (Scalia, J.,

concurring).
243. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111.
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its of affirmative action as a matter of public policy, Adarand
enables elected officials to cloak their support or opposition of
preferences around high-sounding constitutional rhetoric. This is
unfortunate-it reduces the level of respect for the Court among
the other branches and weighs down public discourse on affirmative action with meaningless legalisms.
Adarand, then, does not simply return affirmative action to
elected government.2 44 Instead, the Court's mealy-mouthed approach demonstrates that affirmative action always has been the
province of elected government. Whether the California affirmative action initiative and other political events will fully overtake Adarand is unclear. What is clear, however, is that elected
government and not the Court will decide the fate of affirmative
action.

244. While the Court must stake out meaningful positions on controversial issues to
protect its institutional legitimacy, I do not mean to suggest that the Court's institutional legitimacy hinges on its taking a stand on every controversial issue. See
CHARLES L. BLAcK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 53 (1960) (arguing that the
Court's principal function is to validate elected government decisionmaking). In other
words, although decisions like Adarand diminish the Court's status as a coequal
branch, the Court can (and has) offset the costs of its tentative approach to affirmative action by playing a leadership role on abortion, school desegregation, and
other issues.

